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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Established ￿rms can restrict or prevent competition, due to ￿rst-mover advantages.1 Despite the
fact that most industrialized countries have regulations against monopolization, recent empirical
evidence suggests that entry deterrence is common business practice.2
This paper considers a model where established ￿rms can invest in capacity to the extent that
entry by other ￿rms is deterred. While previous studies have characterized entry deterrence in a
single market, this paper analyzes entry deterrence in a multi-market game.3
The crucial condition for strategic entry deterrence is that the incumbent can make early
decisions, in order to restrict its future freedom of action. While this might be possible in the
single-market game, the conditions may change when ￿rms compete in many markets. Even if the
cost of capacity is sunk, the multi-market incumbent can redistribute some of its capacity from
markets with competition, to markets without. Thus, the ￿rm maintains some degrees of freedom
when acting in more than one market.
This paper is therefore based on two sets of questions: What is the scope for an incumbent
to exploit its ￿rst-mover advantage in a multi-market game? Does an incumbent ￿rm have an
incentive to make a commitment to a speci￿c market, in order to prevent competition in that
m a r k e t ,e v e ni fs u c hc o m m i t m e n ti sc o s t l y ?
If multi-market competition facilitates entry-deterrence, it should be expected that integrated
markets are more concentrated than segmented markets. On the other hand, if the opposite
holds and multi-market competition obstructs the incumbent￿s possibilities to restrict competition,
1Strategic variables considered in the literature on entry deterrence include price (Bain , 1996, Sylos-Labini, 1962,
Gaskins, 1971, Kamien and Schwartz, 1971, Matthews and Mirman, 1983), cost (Smiley and Ravid, 1983 , Spence,
1981), patent policy (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982), product variety (Schmalensee, 1978 ), advertising (Comanor and
Wilson, 1967) and capacity (Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980, Gelman and Salop, 1983, Allen, 1993).
2For a summary of diﬀerent features of national competition laws in industrial countries, see OECD (1996), and
for empirical evidence on strategic entry deterrence, see Smiley (1988), Bunch and Smiley (1992), and Allen et al
(1995). It should be noted, however, that American case law has placed a heavy burden on plaintiﬀst op r o v et h a t
a capacity expansion is clearly meant to hurt competitors and harm competition, which would be the case if such
conduct were to be considered illegal (see Dobson et al, 1994).
3Entry deterrence through capacity investment in single market games was ￿rst analyzed in Spence (1977) and
Dixit (1980).
2integrated markets should be expected to be less concentrated. Hence, the issue of market-linkages
is important for any theory of market integration.
This paper considers a market situation described as a multi-stage game, where the incumbent
￿rst selects a global capacity, then competes with a number of entrants determined at the local level.
In this respect, this model diﬀers from most previous studies of multi-market interaction, where
it is often assumed that ￿rms are allowed to make decisions at the multi-market level exclusively,
referred to as the integrated market hypothesis, or at the local level, referred to as the segmented
market hypothesis.4
In the model presented in this paper, each ￿rm is assumed to exhibit a symmetric Leontief
technology with a ￿xed unit-cost of production. Furthermore, demand is considered to be inde-
pendent between markets and ￿rms compete in strategic substitutes in the last stage of the game.
The incumbent ￿rm is free to redistribute its global capacity between diﬀerent markets. Hence,
there is a strategic link between diﬀerent markets.5
The possibility to redistribute global capacity between markets makes entry-deterrence more
diﬃcult and more costly than in a single-market game. To deter entry, the multi-market ￿rm must
install capacity beyond the level required in a single-market game.6 Interestingly, the per-market
capacity installed to deter entry can be strictly larger than the largest subgame-perfect investment
in the single-market game. However, no capacity will be left idle in equilibrium.7
4Venables (1990) and Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) are two exceptions. In their models, capacity decisions are
made on an integrated basis and other decisions, e.g. price and sales decisions, on a national basis. The model in this
paper closely resembles Venables￿ as well as Ben-Zvi and Helpman￿s models in its attempt to analyze the importance
of investment when capacity can be used on a multi-market level, while sales decisions are taken on a local basis.
5See Witteloostuijn and Wegberg (1992), for an extensive summary on multi-market competition models where
existing ￿rms are potential entrants. In particular, Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klemperer (1985) present a multi-
market model relating to our analysis. They study a multi-market game where two ￿rms compete in one market,
but where one of the ￿rms is a monopolist in a second market. If the two markets exhibit joint economies, then
a positive shock in one market has positive eﬀects on entry deterrence in the other market, provided that the
products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. In our model, however, the unit-cost is ￿xed and Bulow,
Geanakopolos and Klemperer￿s analysis does not apply.
6This paper is not concerned with the relative pro￿tability of entry deterrence and accomodation. In Ganslandt
(1997), it has been shown that entry deterrence is pro￿table, if suﬃcient conditions are satis￿ed.
7It should be noted that these results do generally not hold. In a similar two-￿rm, two-stage game with iso-elastic
3In an extension of the model, it is demonstrated that the results also hold for strategic comple-
ments, if suﬃcient conditions apply. It is concluded that in many reasonable cases, the incumbent
is obliged to install extra capacity in order to deter entry in the multi-market game.
If the capacity that would deter entry is beyond the monopoly output, the multi-market incum-
bent has an incentive to induce market segmentation. In particular, the incumbent may induce
market segmentation through bundling of products and services. Firms can bundle their tradable
products with locally produced and consumed nontradables. If the product cannot be used with-
out local services, the capacity is assigned to the local market, provided that the marginal cost of
expanding the local capacity of services in other markets is suﬃciently high. In this respect, these
results relate to Horn and Shy (1996), where market segmentation is endogenously determined
through bundling of tradables with nontradables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces four versions of the multi-market
game. Section 3 is devoted to the ￿rst version of the game, which is similar to Selten￿s (1978)
chain store game. In this version, a multi-market ￿rm competes sequentially with several potential
entrants in distinct markets. Section 4 studies the second version of the multi-market game, where
the incumbent competes with n ￿rms simultaneously, after the capacity choice has been made.
Section 5 deals with the third version, where the multi-market ￿rm competes with a second large
player, which is a potential entrant in all n markets. Section 6 introduces market commitments and
analyzes under what circumstances the incumbent will serve markets from a single multi-market
plant as opposed to many local plants. Section 7 shows that our main result holds if ￿rms compete
in strategic complements, if suﬃcient conditions apply. Section 8 illustrates three applications and
section 9 concludes.
2 Multi-Market Entry Deterrence
Four versions of a multi-market game are considered. In the ￿rst three versions, production capacity
is assumed to be used at the multi-market level. The incumbent is not allowed to assign parts of its
demand, the incumbent will hold excess capacity which is idle and will be utilized only in the event of entry. This
result is easily shown in a simple model, originally set up by Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klemperer (1985). Similar
results with multiple incumbent ￿rms are shown by Barham and Ware (1993).
4total capacity to local markets. Instead, capacity can be redistributed between diﬀerent markets,
without additional costs. The ￿rst three cases diﬀer with respect to potential competition and
timing.
In the ￿rst version of the multi-market game, analyzed in section 3, an incumbent meets sequen-
tial competition from local entrants. The sequential structure is plausible when ￿rms independently
try to specify a certain product. They consider entry as soon as the product speci￿cation is correct
and they have raised enough money for local production. This ￿rst happens to ￿rm one, then to
￿rm two etc. In this ￿rst version of the game, it is assumed that potential entrants only consider
local entry. One rational for this assumption is that the ￿rm has to succeed in its domestic market
before it can raise money for multi￿market expansion.
In the second version of the multi-market game, analyzed in section 4, the incumbent faces
simultaneous competition from local entrants. The simultaneous structure arises when the in-
cumbent owns a global patent expiring at the same time in all local markets. In this case, local
competitors already have a correct speci￿cation of the product. As soon as the patent expires, they
immediately consider entry in the local market. In the second version of the game, the assumption
that potential competitors only consider local entry is maintained.
In the third version of the multi-market game, analyzed in section 5, the incumbent faces simul-
taneous competition from a single multi-market competitor in all markets. This market structure
is plausible if the ￿rst competitor to ￿nish the process of product speci￿cation immediately con-
siders a multi-market strategy, or if a global patent expires in all markets simultaneously and the
potential entrant can raise enough money for multi-market entry.
After the analysis of the ￿rst three versions of the multi-market game, the assumptions about
the incumbent￿s possibilities to restrict competition are changed. In the fourth version of the game,
analyzed in section 6, the incumbent is allowed to assign parts of its capacity to local markets.
The choice of a certain production organization is a trade-oﬀ between the cost of entry-deterrence
with the multi-market capacity and the cost of market assignments.
53 Sequential Competition from Local Entrants
A multi-market ￿rm, type m, has advertised its product and now meets demand for its product
in n markets, numbered 1 to n. In each market, there is a potential entrant, type e, who might
raise enough funding from creditors to establish a ￿rm in market t, selling the same product as
the multi-market enterprise.
Entry in a local market is associated with a ￿xed cost A,w h i c hc a nb ec o n s i d e r e da na d v e r t i s i n g
cost, that makes consumers in the local market aware of the entrant. Advertising makes all
consumers in the market aware of the ￿rm and its products, but does not aﬀect aggregate demand
for the homogenous goods. There is no personal arbitrage, since consumers are only aware of ￿rms
advertising in their home market. Accordingly, prices need not be internationally equalized.
In the ￿rst version of the multi-market game, we focus on a situation where each potential
competitor considers advertising in a single market only and, consequently, intends to remain
l o c a l . A tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h eg a m en o n eo ft h ep o t e n t i a le n t r a n t sh a sas u ﬃciently correct
speci￿cation for starting production. But as time passes, one after another, they ￿nish the process
of speci￿cation and raise enough credit to enter the local market. This will ￿rst happen to entrant
1, then to entrant 2, etc. As soon as a player has speci￿ed the product correctly, he must decide to
enter or stay out of the market. If he decides to stay out, he is no longer a potential competitor.8
If a local ￿rm enters a market, the incumbent and the entrant choose outputs simultaneously and
the market clears as a duopoly. If the potential entrant stays out, monopoly will prevail.
After this description of the market situation in the ￿rst version of the multi-market game, we
turn to a formal speci￿cation of the model. The game, Γ1
n,h a sn+1 players, player m and player
1,...,n (n ≥ 1). There are n separate markets, labelled 1,..,n. The game is played over a sequence
of periods 0,...,n.I np e r i o d0, the incumbent, player m, must choose a pre-entry capacity k, which
is immediately announced to all players. At the beginning of period t = 1,...,n,p l a y e rt decides
to enter or stay out of market t.P l a y e rt￿s decision is announced to all players. If player t decides
to enter, player m and player t will choose xm
t and xe
t simultaneously, where subscripts refer to
8This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. It is not restrictive. Indeed, it can be shown that a potential
entrant will not bene￿t from delaying its entry decision.
6markets and superscripts to ￿rm-type. If player t decides to stay out of market t monopoly will
prevail in that market. The output decision is immediately announced to all players. At the end
of period t, the market clears and payoﬀs are distributed to player m and player t.N e x t , f o r
t = 1,...,n−1 period t+1 begins and is played according to the same rules. The game ends after
period n.
Player m￿s payoﬀ is the sum of n partial payoﬀsf o rt = 1,...,n.P l a y e rm￿s revenue in market
t is v(xm
t ,x e
t). The cost of capital is additive and the marginal cost is c>0. The objective of
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a n di ti sr e q u i r e dt h a txm
1 + .. + xm
n ≤ k.S e t t i n gu pa￿rm, i.e. entering market t, is associated
with a ￿xed cost A>0 for player t.P l a y e rt￿s revenue is v(xe
t,x m
t ). Marginal capital cost is c>0









t ) − cxe
t − A if it enters
0 if it stays out
(2)
Next, we introduce some notation before proceeding with the analysis. I will de￿ne strate-
gic substitutes, introduce a necessary and suﬃcient condition on entry-deterrence and de￿ne the
deterrence level.
We shall call xi
t a strategic substitute for x
j
t, if the partial cross-derivative of the pro￿tf u n c t i o n
with respect to the strategic variables is strictly negative. Strategic substitutes imply that when
a ￿rm has a more aggressive strategy, the optimal response of the other ￿rm is to play less
aggressively. The condition that xi
t is a strategic substitute for x
j














Second, a best-reply function with a non-binding capacity restriction on player m in the one-
period game Γ1
1, denoted βm (xe
1), is introduced. Correspondingly, the entrant￿s best reply function
7is denoted βe (xm
1 ). The best reply functions βm(xe
1) and βe (xm
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If a potential competitor decides to enter in period 1, this gives the following Nash equilibrium,
when the capacity constraint is non-binding for the incumbent: {xm
1 ,xe
1}, where xm
1 = βm (xe
1),
xe
1 = βe (xm
1 ).I f k ≤ xm
1 , the incumbent will use the entire capacity, but with k>xm
1 some




1 (k)=m i n{k,xm
1 } and b xe
1 = βe (b xm
1 (k)).
In the second subgame in the second stage, with no entry, we obtain the following Nash equilib-











1 is the monopoly level the incumbent would choose, if the cost of capacity was sunk and
capacity did not restrict output.
When the ￿rms compete in strategic substitutes, the potential entrant￿s pro￿t is decreasing in
the incumbent￿s output. However, the incumbent does not choose an output above the limit xm
1 ,
if the potential competitor enters the local market. Thus, under condition (S), it is a necessary
condition for entry deterrence that the pro￿t of the potential entrant is non-positive in a Nash




t ) − cxe
t − A ≤ 0
If the necessary deterrence condition D is satis￿ed, condition S is a suﬃcient condition for entry
deterrence. However, it can easily be shown that S is not a necessary condition for the result. In
particular, the result can hold, even if the strategic variables are strategic complements.
If D is satis￿ed and player t would earn a positive pro￿t as a monopoly it follows from the
Theorem of Intermediate Values that the pro￿to ft h ee n t r a n tm u s tb ee q u a lt oz e r oa ts o m e
positive level of output by the incumbent. This deterrence level will be denoted e x and de￿ned:
π(βe (e x), e x) − cβe (e x) − A =0 (4)
Thus, if the established ￿rm successfully commits to an output e x, it deters entry. It is also
8assumed that e x is above the output level of a natural monopoly. In other words, the entry-
deterring incumbent in our model is operating beyond the scale of operation it would choose, if it
did not face potential entry.
Next, three results from the ￿rst version of the multi-market game, Γ1
n, can be shown. First, D
is a suﬃcient condition on entry deterrence in the multi-market game. Second, if ￿rms compete in
strategic substitutes, then D is not only a suﬃcient, but a necessary, condition for entry deterrence.
Third, if both conditions S and D are satis￿ed, the incumbent installs strictly more than n • e x to
deter entry in Γ1
n.
If D is satis￿ed the local entrant does not earn a positive pro￿ti n{xm
t ,xe
t}, and would thus stay
out of the local market. To see that D is a suﬃcient condition for entry deterrence, assume that
the incumbent has installed more capacity in period 0 than he will ever use. Thus, every market
can be treated independently and the unique Nash equilibrium in every market t is {xm
t ,xe
t},a n d
entry deterrence is thus possible.
Proposition 1 If D is satis￿ed, then entry deterrence is possible in Γ1
n.
Proof. (D ⇒ entry deterrence is possible). Let the pre-commitment capacity be very large. The
capacity constraint is not binding in any subgame. The objective of the incumbent is to maximize
its pro￿t with respect to xm






=0 ∀t.( 5 )
This problem is additively independent and each market can be considered as a separate one-
market game Γ1





,w h e r exm
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xt¢
, xt = βt (xm





−cxt −A ≤ 0,p l a y e rt will choose
to stay out and monopoly prevails.
Next, we will show that, the deterrence condition (D) is not only a suﬃcient, but also a necessary
condition on entry deterrence, if ￿rms compete in strategic substitutes. Strategic substitutes (S)
imply that the pro￿t of a potential entrant is monotonically decreasing in the incumbent output.




is the unique Nash equilibrium with entry in market
t. Furthermore, xm
t is the highest output the incumbent will select with any capacity k. Hence,




, the same will hold in any Nash
equilibrium in the post-entry game. Thus it enters market t and entry deterrence is not possible.
Proposition 2 If condition S is satis￿ed and condition D is violated, then entry deterrence is not
possible in Γ1
n.
Proof. (S and +D⇒+ entry deterrence). First, note that xm
t is player m￿s highest output
level in a subgame with entry in market t. From (S), π(xe
t,x m
t ) is monotonically decreasing in xm
t
and reaches its minimum at xm





− cxt − A>0,p l a y e rt could ensure a
positive pro￿t, if entering market t.
After these two qualitative results, a more precise result can be established, characterizing
the disadvantage of multi-market competition on entry-deterrence. If ￿rms compete in strategic
substitutes and the necessary deterrence condition is satis￿ed, the incumbent must install k>n e x
to deter entry in the n￿market game Γ1
n.
Consider for instance the two-market game. Why is twice the deterrence level, e x, not enough
to deter entry in two markets? The main reason is that if one potential competitor enters and the
other stays out, the incumbent has an incentive to redistribute capacity to the monopoly market.
In the last period, the remaining capacity is k − xm
1 . If condition D is satis￿ed, k − xm
1 ≥ e x
will deter entry. Working backwards to period 1, there are two subgames. If player 1 stays out,
the incumbent will split the capacity equally in both markets. If the potential competitor enters,












It follows from strategic substitutes that k −xm
1 >x m
1 .T h u s ,i fk =2 e x,t h e nxm
1 < e x and entry is
not deterred in the ￿rst market. More speci￿cally,
Proposition 3 If D and S are satis￿ed in the ￿rst version of the n-market game, Γ1
n,t h e nt h e
multi-market incumbent installs capacity ne x<k
1
n ≤ e x +( n − 1)x
0 to deter entry.
Proof. Appendix A
104 Simultaneous Competition from Local Entrants
Consider a market situation similar to the ￿rst version of the multi-market game. In this ver-
sion, the incumbent owns a global patent expiring at the same time in all markets and potential
competitors can enter the local markets simultaneously. If a potential competitor challenges the
established ￿rm in a local market, the incumbent and the entrant choose outputs simultaneously
and the market will clear as duopoly. If the potential entrant stays out, monopoly will prevail.
The rules of the second version of the multi-market game are de￿ned as follows. The game, Γ2
n,
has n+1 players, player m and player 1,...,n(n ≥ 1). The game is played over two periods. In the
￿rst period, the incumbent must choose a pre-entry capacity, k. At the beginning of the second
period, player t = 1,...,n must simultaneously decide to enter or stay out of market t.P l a y e r
t￿s decision is immediately announced to all other players. If player t decides to enter market t,
then the incumbent and the entrant choose xm
t and xe
t simultaneously. At the end of the second
period, all markets clear and payoﬀs are distributed to the incumbent and players 1,...,n.P l a y e r
m￿s payoﬀ is given by eq. (1) and player t￿s payoﬀ by eq. (2).
The analysis in the second version of the multi-market game is similar to the analysis in the
￿rst version. If players compete in strategic substitutes and the necessary deterrence condition
is satis￿ed, entry can also be deterred in the second version of the game. To deter entry, the
established ￿rm must install k>n e x in the n￿market game.
Consider, for instance, the two-market case. There are four subgames in the last stage of the
two-market game. In two of the four subgames, one potential competitor enters, and the other
stays out. To see why twice the single market deterrence capacity does not suﬃce, consider the










(2e x − xm
1 ,0) (7)
Strategic substitutes imply that the output in the duopoly market is strictly lower than the deter-
rence level, i.e. xm
1 < e x. Thus, entry would not be deterred.
Proposition 4 If D and S are satis￿ed in the second version of the n-market game, Γ2
n,t h e nt h e
incumbent installs capacity ne x<k
2
n ≤ e x +( n − 1)x
0 to deter entry.
11Proof. Appendix B
The ￿rst and the second version of the multi-market game diﬀer in one important respect. If
the incumbent installed enough capacity to deter simultaneous entry by all potential competitors
but not enough to deter unilateral entry by one potential competitor, then the potential entrants
would face a coordination problem in the second version of the game. This coordination problem
does not occur in the ￿rst version where player 1 enters and player 2 stays out. In the second
version, both potential competitors wish to enter if they are the only entrant, but not otherwise. 9
The coordination problem in the second version of the game remains unsolved, since both Nash
equilibria are strict. This problem will not be further dealt with, since we are mainly interested in
the conditions on entry deterrence. In a real market situation, however, the coordination problem
may aﬀect the entrants￿ decisions and, possibly, facilitate entry-deterrence.
5 Competition from a Multi-Market Entrant
Once more, a multi-market ￿rm has advertised and meets demand for its product in n markets. In
the third version of the multi-market game, a single potential competitor, another multi-market
company, considers entry in all markets selling the same product as the established ￿rm. The
incumbent￿s global patent expires at the same time in all markets and the potential competitor
may enter all local markets simultaneously. Entry in each market is associated with a ￿xed sunk
cost, which can be considered an advertising cost. The multi-market entrant remains unknown in
all markets where it does not advertise. If the second multi-market ￿rm enters the local market,
the incumbent and the entrant choose their output simultaneously and the market will clear as a
duopoly.
The rules of the third version of the game are de￿ned as follows. The game, Γ3
n,h a st w o
players, called player m and player e. The game is played over a sequence of two periods. In the
￿rst period, the established ￿rm must choose a pre-entry capacity, k. At the beginning of the
second period, the potential competitor must decide to enter or stay out in n separate markets
called t = 1,...,n.P l a y e re￿s decision is immediately announced to player m.I fp l a y e re decides
9This is a version of the ￿chicken￿ game.
12to enter market t, the players will choose xm
t and xe
t simultaneously. If player e decides to stay
out, monopoly will prevail in that market. At the end of the second period, all markets clear and
payoﬀs are distributed to player m and player e.
The incumbent￿s payoﬀ is given by eq. (1). Entry in market t is associated with a market-
speci￿c ￿xed cost A>0 for player e.L e t E be the set of all markets that player e will enter.
Player e￿s partial revenue, in a market it enters, is v(xe
t,x m
t ). The per-unit capital cost is c>0.









t ) − cxe
t − A) (8)
Inequality D is also a suﬃcient condition on entry deterrence in the third version of the multi-
market game. If the incumbent invests in a suﬃciently large capacity, which makes the capacity
constraint non-binding in every subgame, the optimal output in every market can be independently
determined. The potential competitor chooses its optimal strategy in each market separately, and







.T h u s ,p l a y e re￿s partial revenue does not cover the ￿xed and variable costs in
any market and the total payoﬀ is negative.
In fact, the strategic interaction in the second and third versions of the multi-market game
is identical, except for the coordination problem in the second version of the game. Two factors
make the strategic decisions in the two games identical with respect to entry deterrence. First,
the strategic variables xe
1,...,x e
n are independent to the entrant in the third version of the multi-
market game and it will choose its optimal strategy in each market separately. Thus, player e￿s
best reply function in market t is identical to player t￿s best reply function in the second version
of the multi-market game.
Second, since the ￿xed cost A is the same in all markets, the revenue in each market the
potential competitor enters must cover the variable and ￿xed costs. Player e would only enter a
market where the expected payoﬀ is positive, which exactly resembles the condition on entry for
a local competitor in Γ2
n. The analysis of the second version of the game therefore also applies to
the third version. Player m must install k>n e x to deter entry in the n￿market game Γ3
n.
13Proposition 5 If D and S are satis￿ed in the third version of the two-market game, Γ3
n,t h e nt h e
incumbent installs capacity ne x<k
3
n ≤ e x +( n − 1)x
m to deter entry.
Proof. Appendix B
In the previous sections, the diﬃculties of entry deterrence in the ￿rst, second and third versions
of the multi-market game have been characterized. It takes more capacity than n times the
deterrence level e x to deter entry of many potential competitors in a sequential or simultaneous




n. Thus, the unique optimal deterring capacity is independent of the market
situation, as described in the ￿rst, second and third versions of the multi-market game.
Proposition 6 If conditions D and S are satis￿ed, the global capacity required to deter entry in
the n-market game is independent of the timing of the game, i.e. sequential or simultaneous entry
of potential competitors, and the size of the potential entrant.
Proof. Appendix C.
This proposition is interesting for two reasons. First, it might be diﬃcult for the incumbent to
obtain information about potential entrants ex ante, but our results suggest that such information
might not be necessary. The result implies that an incumbent does not need information about
the timing and the number of potential entrants to determine its entry-deterring strategy. The
results of the model apply to several diﬀerent situations, for example both to a situation with one
large competitor and to a situation with competition from a series of local competitors.
Not surprisingly, it also follows that the diﬀerence between the single-market game and the
multi-market game increases with the number of markets in the multi-market game.
If condition D holds with equality, the entry-deterring capacity per market in an n-market
game increases in the number of markets and converges to x
m,a sn goes to in￿nity.
The intuition for this result is that unilateral entry in a single market is harder to deter as
partial exit to the remaining n − 1 markets becomes increasingly attractive. As the number of
monopoly-markets increases, the alternative to ￿ght entry in a single market looks less and less
attractive, in comparison to using the capacity in the remaining monopoly markets. It should,
14however, be noted that per-market pro￿ts are less aﬀected by unilateral entry in a single market,
i ft h en u m b e ro fm a r k e t si sl a r g e .
6 Market Commitments
In this section, I extend the analysis and let the incumbent ￿rst determine the organization of its
production, either with a global capacity, referred to as the global strategy, or with a combination
of a global capacity and local capacities that can be used in speci￿c markets only, referred to
as the local strategy. The local strategy can be regarded as a vertically integrated production
process, where the production process is split into two vertical stages. It will be shown that if
suﬃcient conditions apply, then local capacities can be assigned to local markets and successfully
deter entry.
We study a three-stage game similar to the two-stage game in the previous sections. In the
￿rst stage, the multi-market ￿rm can choose a global or a local strategy. The local strategy, i.e.
assigning a local capacity to each local market, is associated with an extra ￿xed cost G in each
market.
We can now describe the rules of the fourth version of the game. The game, Γ4
n, has two players,
player m and player e. The game is played over a sequence of three stages. In the ￿rst stage, the
incumbent must begin by choosing a local or global strategy. In the second stage, the incumbent
must choose local capacities in each market, kt, and a multi-market capacity, k. Unlike the global
capacity, it is assumed that local capacities can be increased in the third stage. All decisions of
the established ￿rm is immediately announced to the potential competitor. At the beginning of
the third stage, player e must decide to enter or stay out in n separate markets called t = 1,...,n.
Player e￿s decision is announced to the incumbent. If player e decides to enter market t,p l a y e r
m and player e will choose xm
t and xe
t simultaneously. Finally, all markets clear and payoﬀsa r e
distributed to player m and player e.
If the incumbent chooses a local strategy, the unit-cost of local capacity is c1 > 0,a n dt h e
unit-cost of multi-market capacity is c2 > 0. Moreover, each local assignment is associated with
a ￿xed cost G>0. If the incumbent chooses a global strategy, the cost of capacity is c.F o r
15simplicity, we assume that the total unit-cost is independent of the strategy, i.e. c1 + c2 = c.T h e
















t) − c1qt]+c2k − nG local
(9)
where qt =m a x{xm
t ,k t}. The potential competitor must incur a market-speci￿c ￿xed cost A>0
to enter market t.L e t E be the set of all markets that player e will enter. Player e￿s revenue
is v(xe
t,x m
t ). The marginal capital cost is c>0 and additive. The objective of player e is to
maximize its payoﬀ given by eq. (8).
We shall call kt a market commitment, if this part of the total capacity in a multi-market ￿rm
is assigned to market t and cannot pro￿tably be used for production of goods sold in other local
markets. A suﬃcient condition for market commitments is that the marginal cost to increase local
capacity is larger than the marginal incentive to increase the output in a monopoly market at the






Condition C simply guarantees that it is not pro￿table for player m to redistribute capacity to
a monopoly market, if entry occurs in other markets. If condition C is satis￿ed and condition D is
satis￿ed with equality, it is suﬃcient for player m to install a local capacity equal to the deterrence
level kt = e x and a multi-market capacity k = ne x, to deter entry.
Proposition 7 If conditions C, D and S are satis￿ed in the fourth version of the n-market game,
Γ4
n, local capacities kt = e x and global capacity k
4
n = ne x is suﬃcient to deter entry.
Proof. Entry deterrence is possible in Γ4
n, due to (D). Player m will choose a local strategy and
installs capacity k
4
n = ne x and kt = e x for t = 1,..,n.I f p l a y e r e enters all markets, symmetric
incentives imply that xm
t = e x and D implies that the pro￿to fp l a y e re is not positive. If player e
enters one market (w.l.o.g. market 1) and stays out of all other markets, the following inequality













16for t =2 ,...,n.T h e￿rst part of the LHS is equal to zero and from (C), the second part is positive.
Thus the inequality holds. Equal parts of the total capacity should be assigned to each market,
i.e. k
4
n/n. e x deters entry in market t,h e n c ene x is enough to deter entry in all markets.
The incumbent installs strictly less capacity with market commitments compared to the capac-
ity needed to deter entry, if the capacity is not assigned to speci￿cm a r k e t s .T h ed i ﬀerence in the
established ￿rm￿s pro￿t, if C is satis￿ed in Γ4
n, between the local and the global strategy is called
the commitment premium, denoted ∆π. Working backwards, the multi-market ￿rm will choose a
local strategy if the commitment premium minus the cost of assignment is positive.
Proposition 8 If C is satis￿ed in Γ4
n the multi-market ￿rm will choose a local strategy to deter
entry i.f.f. ∆π − nG > 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from the de￿nition of the commitment premium and the cost of a
local strategy.
It follows from this proposition that a local strategy is more likely, the lower the assignment
cost. Thus, the organization of production within the multi-market ￿rm is primarily determined
by the relationship between economies of scale at the local level and the commitment premium.
Another important issue is what factors determine the incumbent￿s opportunities to make
market commitments. These factors can be exogenous, e.g. diﬀerent national standards or trade
regulations. A more interesting case, however, is when the incumbent chooses to induce market
segmentation endogenously.
First, ￿rms can bundle their tradable products with locally produced and consumed nontrad-
ables, e.g. services. If the product cannot be used without local services, the capacity is assigned
to the local market provided that the marginal cost to expand the service capacity is suﬃciently
high. In this case, a global strategy would correspond to the manufacturing of a sophisticated
product, which can be used without services. A local strategy, on the other hand, would be to
produce a less sophisticated product which must be consumed with some local support or services.
Second, strategic market segmentation can occur in a horizontally diﬀerentiated product space.
If consumers in the local markets have preferences for local products, capacities can be assigned to
17the domestic market. The local strategy is manufacturing of goods adapted to local preferences,
i.e. products which can be used by consumers in a speci￿c market only, and the global strategy is
production of a standardized good, which can be used by consumers in all markets. If the cost of
adjusting the adapted products in the post-entry game is suﬃciently high, the local strategy can
successfully deter entry.
Third, market commitment can be induced by network lock-ins. The producer can introduce
local standards, which assign capacities to a speci￿c market. In this case, a global strategy is a
standard common to all markets.
Thus, the model of endogenously determined multi-market production potentially applies to
many diﬀerent market conditions.
7 Price Competition in Diﬀerentiated Goods
Having shown that multi-market competition obstructs the incumbent￿s possibilities to deter entry
if ￿rms compete in strategic substitutes, we will now show that strategic complements give the
same result, if suﬃcient conditions apply.
An incumbent commit to a global capacity for two markets in the ￿rst stage. A potential
entrant in each market, called player t, observes the incumbent￿s capacity and then chooses to
e n t e ro rs t a yo u t .I fp l a y e rt enters market t, the incumbent and the entrant both choose prices
for their respective variety of the diﬀerentiated good.
We use the Shubik (1980) system of demand functions where the demand for variety i in market















where n is the total number of active ￿rms in the local market, pt is the average price in the local
market and g is a measure of substitutability between products. Assume that the parameters of
the model satisfy some restrictions, a ≥ b ≥ c, and that the degree of substitutability is not too
large, g ≤ 2.
Consider a situation where entry deterrence is possible in the single-market game and the
entrant makes zero pro￿t in a subgame with a nonbinding capacity constraint for the incumbent.
18It can be shown that twice the capacity needed to deter entry in a single market game does not
suﬃce to deter entry in the multi-market game. For this purpose, let k be exactly twice the capacity
needed to deter entry in a single market game. Capacity k/2 in a market without entry results
in a price which is strictly higher than the price the incumbent would set as a monopolist, if the
capacity constraint was not binding. If unilateral entry in market 1 occurs, pro￿t maximization













.( 1 2 )
It is not satis￿ed, however, if the capacity is evenly distributed between the markets. In this
case, the RHS is strictly negative and the incumbent will increase its pro￿tb ys e t t i n gal o w e r
price in its monopoly market and move some productive capacity to this market.10 Accordingly,
the resulting price in market 1 is higher. But ￿rms compete in strategic complements and a
price increase by the incumbent is followed by a price increase by the entrant, which increases the
pro￿t of the entrant in equilibrium and, therefore, entry is not deterred. Hence, as in the case of
strategic substitutes, the multi-market incumbent must install more capacity to deter entry in the
multi-market game.
8 Applications
(i) Franchising and Strategic Delegation
Franchising is a long-term vertical contract between a franchisor (the incumbent) and a franchisee.
Through the contract, the franchisor collects revenues from a franchise fee as well as from the
wholesale markup. The contract allows the incumbent to strategically design the terms of the
contract in order to overcome its own incentives in the future.11 Had￿eld (1991) shows that in
a model of horizontal product diﬀerentiation, strategically designed franchise contracts can deter
entry.
Following Had￿eld (1991), we can analyze market commitments through strategic delegation
in our model. Consider a franchise contract which is a standard-form, long-term-duration contract







11This idea of strategic delegation was ￿rst suggested by Schelling (1980) .
19designed by the incumbent and oﬀered to potential franchisees. The contract consists of a franchise
fee, F, a wholesale price scheme, w(xt), and an exclusive territory, t.T h e c o n t r a c t o b l i g e s a
franchisee to sell the product to customers in its own market only, i.e. exporting the product to
another territory is either prohibited or associated with an additional fee, c. The contract also
speci￿es that violations of the contract are associated with damages, V .
The incumbent can then design a contract with the following terms; the wholesale price is
zero up to a quantity equal to one n:th of the incumbent￿s global capacity and in￿nite thereafter,
the exclusive territory is a local market, t, and the franchise fee is the expected revenue for a
monopolist in that market, minus the assignment cost, i.e. F = v(k/n,0) − G.
Under this contract, the independent franchisee in each market has an incentive to produce and
sell its full capacity and entry is successfully deterred. The market assignment cost is identical to
the pro￿t of the franchisee and it is determined by the relative bargaining power of the franchisee
and the incumbent. Hence, the pro￿tability of franchising for the manufacturing ￿rm is determined
by the outcome of the bargaining between the franchisor and the franchisees.
(ii) Strategic Investment and Multinational Production
Multinational production and strategic foreign direct investment constitute another natural appli-
cation of the model.12
Consider a modi￿ed version of the game. The incumbent ￿rm has incurred the market-speci￿c
￿xed costs and meet demand for its product in all markets. In the ￿rst stage, the incumbent has
two options: either to concentrate production in a single plant, i.e. an export strategy, or to install
local plants, i.e. a multinational strategy. If it is choosing the former strategy, the incumbent must
choose a global pre-entry capacity, whereas, if it is choosing the latter strategy, the incumbent must
choose a global capacity and local capacities assigned to each of the plants. In the second stage, a
potential competitor considers entry in the local markets. If it enters, it must also decide whether
12In models with variable trade costs, Smith (1987) and Horstmann and Markusen (1987), show that an incumbent
has an incentive to make a foreign direct investment to deter entry. Multinational production reduces variable costs
and makes the incumbent more aggressive. A more aggressive play will reduce the revenues of potential entrants
and, thus, entry is deterred. If monopoly rents outweigh any costs associated with installing an additional plant, the
￿rst-mover would choose this strategy.
20to establish one or several plants.
In this game a multi-market incumbent can choose a multinational or export strategy to deter
entry. The multinational strategy requires less total capacity, while the export strategy requires
fewer plants. For some parameter values the multinational strategy is a more pro￿table strategy
to deter entry, for other values the export strategy is more pro￿table.
However, if the ￿rms must incur a ￿rm-speci￿cc o s t ,F, as well as plant-speci￿c costs, G,
the current speci￿cation adds a new dimension to the problem. The ￿rm-speci￿cc o s tr e s u l t si n
economies of scale at the ￿rm level and the plant-specifc cost in economies of scale at the plant
level. An entrant can use these assets in all markets, which makes single-market entry less pro￿table
compared to multi-market entry. Hence, single-market entry can be a strictly dominated strategy.
But this is not the case in all situations. If scale-economies at the ￿rm and plant level are not too
large, the potential entrant will consider single-market entry rather than multi-market entry.
(iii) Mergers
An international merger is a union of assets from two ￿rms previously active in two distinct
geographic markets. The multi-market model in this paper can be used for analyzing the eﬀect of
these types of mergers.
Consider a situation where two ￿rms have separately entered two local markets and successfully
deterred further entry. Each ￿rm is active in one market only. Local production is associated with
a ￿xed cost, G.I ft h e￿rms choose to merge, they will reduce their ￿xed costs. If capacity can be
u s e di na l lm a r k e t s ,t h em e r g e d￿rm is obliged to install more capacity and expand its output to
successfully deter entry in the post-merger equilibrium. If the ￿rm cannot expand its capacity to
deter entry, the result is local entry in one of the markets. In both cases, production is expanded
and the monopoly distortion is reduced. Hence, the merger is clearly pro-competitive.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
Multi-market competition without market commitment makes the incumbent￿s possibilities to
exploit ￿rst-mover advantages more diﬃcult. A ￿rm￿s opportunity in one market in￿uences its
21possibility to successfully commit to its optimal strategy in a second market. The incumbent must
install a higher level of global capacity to successfully deter entry in all markets. If exogenous
or endogenous factors allow the incumbent to assign parts of its capacity to local markets, multi-
market production can be pro￿table, even under increasing returns to scale at the global level.
The results suggest that local investments can be regarded as market commitments, in order to
restrict or prevent competition in speci￿c markets.
22References
[1] Allen, B (1993), ￿Capacity precommitment as an entry barrier for price-setting ￿rms￿, Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 11:63-72.
[2] Allen, B, R. Deneckere, T. Faith and D. Kovenock (1995), ￿Capacity precommitment as a
barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth Approach￿, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Staﬀ Report, No187, February 1995.
[3] Bain, J. (1956), Barrier to new competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
[4] Barham B. and R. Ware (1993), ￿A sequential entry model with strategic use of excess ca-
pacity￿, Canadian Journal of Economics 26:286-298.
[5] Ben-Zvi S. and E. Helpman (1992), ￿Oligopoly in segmented markets￿. In G. M. Grossman,
Imperfect competition and international trade, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[6] Bulow J.I., J.D. Geanakopolos and P.D. Klemperer (1985), ￿Holding idle capacity to deter
entry￿, Economic Journal 95:178-82.
[7] Bulow J.I., J.D. Geanakopolos and P.D. Klemperer (1985), ￿Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic
substitutes and complements￿, Journal of Political Economy 93:488-511.
[8] Bunch, D.S. and R. Smiley (1992), ￿Who deters entry? Evidence on the use of strategic entry
deterrents￿, Review of Economics and Statistics 74:509-21.
[9] Comanor, W. and T. Wilson (1967), ￿Advertising, market structure and performance￿, Review
of Economics and Statistics 49:423-440.
[10] Dixit A. (1980), ￿The role of investment in entry-deterrence￿, Economic Journal 90:95-106.
[11] Dobson, C.D., W.G. Shepherd, and R.D. Stoner (1994), ￿Strategic capacity preemption:
DuPont (Titanium Dioxid) (1980)￿. In Kwoka, J. and L. J. White (eds), The antitrust revo-
lution (2nd edition), HarperCollinsCollege Publishers, New York
23[12] Gaskins, D. (1971), ￿Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry￿, Journal
of Economic Theory 3:306-322.
[13] Gelman, J.R. and Salop, S.C., ￿Judo economics: capacity limitation and coupon competition￿,
Bell Journal of Economics 14:315-25.
[14] Gilbert, R. and D. Newberry (1982), ￿Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly￿,
American Economic Review 72:514-526.
[15] Had￿eld, G.K. (1991), ￿Credible spatial preemption through franchising￿, Rand Journal of
Economics 22:531-543.
[16] Horn M. and O. Shy (1996), ￿Bundling and international market segmentation￿, International
Economic Review 37:51-69.
[17] Horstmann, I.J. and J.R. Markusen (1987) ￿Strategic investments and the development of
multinationals,￿ International Economic Review 28, 109-121.
[18] Kamien, M. and N. Schwartz (1971), ￿Limit pricing and uncertain entry￿, Econometrica,
39:441-454.
[19] Matthews, S. and L. Mirman (1983), ￿Equilibrium limit pricing: The eﬀects of private infor-
mation and stochastic demand￿, Econometrica 51:981-96.
[20] OECD (1996), Abuse of dominance and monopolisation - Competition policy roundtables No
8, OCDE/GD(96)131.
[21] Schelling, T. (1960), The strategy of con￿ict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
[22] Schmalensee, R. (1978), ￿Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry￿, Bell
Journal of Economics 9:305-27.
[23] Selten R. (1978), ￿The chain store paradox￿, Theory and Decision 9:127-159.
[24] Shubik, M. (1980), Market structure and behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, England.
24[25] Smiley, R. and A. Ravid (1983), ￿The importance of being ￿rst: learning price and strategy￿,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:353-62.
[26] Smiley, R. (1988), ￿Empirical evidence on strategic entry deterrence￿, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 6:167-80.
[27] Smith A. (1987), ￿Strategic investment, multinational corporations and trade policy,￿ Euro-
pean Economic Review 31:89-96.
[28] Spence, A.M. (1977), ￿Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic Pricing￿, Bell Journal of
Economics 8:534-544.
[29] Spence, A.M. (1981), ￿The learning curve and competition￿, Bell Journal of Economics 12:49-
70.
[30] Sylos-Labini, P. (1962), Oligopoly and technical progress, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
[31] Venables A. (1990), ￿International capacity choice and national market games￿, Journal of
International Economics 29:23-42.
[32] Witteloostuijn A. and M. Wegberg (1992), ￿Multimarket competition￿, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 18:273-282.
25Appendix A. Sequential Entry
Proof. Step 1. Start in period n. Let the remaining capacity be kn = kn−1 − xm
n−1. There are
two subgames; either player n enters or stays out of market n. I nt h es u b g a m ew i t he n t r y ,t h e
unique Nash equilibrium is {b xm
n (kn), b xe
n}, where b xm
n (kn)=m i n{kn,xm} and b xe
n = βe (b xm
n (kn)).













=0 . The unique Nash equilibrium in the subgame with no entry is {b xm
n (k),0},
where b xm




.F r o mS ,i tf o l l o w st h a tx
m > xm.
Step 2.P l a y e rn would enter if kn < e x and stay out as long as kn ≥ e x. To deter entry, player m
would need kn ≥ e x. Now, assume that enough unused capacity remains to deter entry. Rewrite the
equilibrium output of player m in period n as a function of kn−1 and xm













Step 3. Working backwards to period n − 1,w eh a v et w os u b g a m e s ;e i t h e rp l a y e rn − 1 enters or
stays out of market n − 1. First, capacity kn−1 would ensure a successful commitment by player
m in market n − 1 to an output e xm













































n−1. To deter entry, player











n−1 > 0,i tf o l l o w sf r o m( S )t h a txm
n > e x ⇒ kn−1 > 2e x. If (D) holds with equality, i.e.
e x = xm,t h e nt h eL H So fe q u a l i t y[14] is equal to zero and the equality is satis￿ed if and only if
kn−1 − e x = x
m ⇒ kn−1 = e x + x
m.
Step 4. Working backwards to period n − 2,w eh a v et w os u b g a m e s ;e i t h e rp l a y e rn − 2 enters or


















26From (S), we have xm
n = xm
n−1 > e x ⇒ kn−2 > 3e x. If (D) holds with equality, i.e. e x = xm,t h e n
the LHS of equality [14] equals to zero and the equality is satis￿ed if and only if kn−2 − e x =
2x
m ⇒ kn−1 = e x +2 x
m. Work in the same way inductively to period 1. In period 1, we have
xm
n = xm
n−1 = .. = x2 > e x ⇒ k>n e x a n da s( D )h o l d sw i t he q u a l i t ykn−1 = e x +( n − 1)x
m.T h e
entry deterring capacity k

















for t =2 ,..,n (16)
and we conclude that k
1 ∈
¡
ne x, e x +( n − 1)x
m⁄
.


















t = k/n < x
m for all t = 1,...,n. Hence, the entire capacity will be used in an equilibrium
without entry. No capacity is left idle.
Step 6. Working backward to period 0, the incumbent would install k
1 to deter entry in all markets.
27Appendix B. Simultaneous Entry
This proof is valid for the main result in the second and third versions of the multi-market game.















2 + .. + xm
n <k ,t h e n∂v(xm
t ,x e
t)/∂xm
t =0for t = 1,...,n.I f xm
1 + xm











Step 2. In the last stage there are 2n subgames. First, if entry does not occur in any market and
k>n x
m,t h e n∂v(xm
t ,0)/∂xm
t =0for all t = 1,...,n ⇒ xm
t = x
m for all t.I f k ≤ nx












n for all t.
Step 3. Second, if one player enters (w.l.o.g. player 1)a n dk>xm+(n − 1)x







1 = xm and xm
t = x
m for t =2 ,..,n.I f k ≤ xm +( n − 1)x
m,





t for t =2 ,...,n⇒ xm
1 <k / nand xm
t >k / n .T o
deter the entry of a single entrant while n − 1 players stays out, the incumbent must install












and from (S) k>n e x.
Step 4. Next, if capacity k deters the entry of a single entrant, k deters the entry of more than









j ≥ 0 (19)
where entry occurs in i and no entry occurs in market j.I ft+1 players enter, deterrence is credible
if
∂v(e xm, e xe)/∂xm
i − ∂v
￿
(k − (t + 1)e xm)




j ≥ 0 (20)
where entry occurs in i and no entry occurs in market j. The last inequality holds as long as
k>n e x. Hence, we have shown that if capacity k deters the entry of a single entrant, then k deters
the entry of more than one entrant.








the LHS is zero and, therefore, the entry-deterring capacity is k = xm +( n − 1)x
m.
Step 6. Working backwards to the ￿rst stage. Now, the incumbent capacity is k
2 ∈
¡


























for t =2 ,..,n. Hence, the implicit conditions are identical for all three versions of the multi-market
game and the entry-deterring capacity is the same.
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